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The plaintiff contended, however, that the transfer was not
made pursuant to the CPLR, but instead, was made pursuant to
64
Article 6, Section 19(a) of the New York State Constitution.
Plaintiff further contended that, for transfers made pursuant to
section 19(a), the court was authorized to render a judgment for
$10,000 under section 19(j) which provides that "each court
shall exercise jurisdiction over any action or proceeding transferred
to it pursuant to this section." 65
The court in rejecting plaintiff's contention relied on section
19(k) which states that the legislature nmuy provide that the judgment in a transferred action shall not be subject to the monetary
limitation of the court to which it is transferred. 6 The obvious
inference from section 19(k) is that since the legislature has not
exercised this power, the lower courts are still subject to their
jurisdictional monetary limitations in actions which are transferred
to them.
The instant case illustrates the confusion caused by having
provisions for transferring actions in both the constitution and the
CPLR.
The practitioner should be extremely wary of the fact that
although the great majority of county courts now have a monetary
jurisdictional limitation of $10,000, there are still eighteen counties
which are subject to the limitation of $6,000.
ARTICLE 6-JOINDER OF CLAIMS, CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE

CPLR 603:

Court has discretion to allow severance in furtherance
of convenience or to avoid prejudice.

In Mullett v. Sacco,6 7 plaintiff, a truck driver, sued defendants

as joint tort-feasors for personal injuries sustained as a result of two
separate collisions occurring within a matter of minutes. The
defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 603 for a severance into two
separate causes of action. The court granted the defendants' motion
on the ground that it would be in the furtherance of convenience
since separate charges to the jury would result in a more equitable
assessment of damages. The court, by this action, established a
joint trial under CPLR 602, and thus preserved the integrity of each
64

"The supreme court may transfer any action . . . except one over
which it shall have exclusive jurisdiction which does not depend upon the
monetary amount sought, to any other court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter within the judicial department provided that such other
court has jurisdiction over the classes of persons named as parties . . .
N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19 (a).

05 N.Y.

CoNST.

art. VI, § 19(j).

66 N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19(k).
6747 Misc. 2d 441, 262 N.Y.S.2d 796
1965).
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cause of action. Thus, separate judgments may be rendered and each
may be separately appealed.'
The courts will allow severance when separate issues of fact
or law are involved. 6 9 Some sound judicial discretion, however, requires that a severance should be granted70only when failure to sever
places some substantial right in jeopardy.
Impairment of such a substantial right is demonstrated in
Young v. Peone,71 wherein the plaintiff sued the owner and driver
of a truck jointly for personal injuries. Upon the default of the
driver, the plaintiff moved for a severance seeking a separate assessment of damages against the driver. Severance was denied because
of the possibility that once the plaintiff secured a default judgment
against the driver he would be able to sue the owner's insurer
directly.7 2 The court considered this prejudicial. The insurer was
considered an equitable party because it would be obligated to
pay the judgment. The prejudice would result from the fact
that the insurer, who had appeared in the action on behalf of the
owner, would be required to respond monetarily without an opportunity to defend on the merits.
However, a question arises which has not yet been resolved. With
a view toward protecting the plaintiff's rights, it should be taken
into consideration that a default judgment may greatly exceed
the insurance coverage. Under these circumstances, there is no
prejudice towards the insurer in allowing severance for the excess
amount. If severance is disallowed, the plaintiff would be forced
to wait, perhaps several years, until the trial before he could proceed
against the defaulting defendant. 73 As a tentative solution, the
court might utilize CPLR 5011 wherein it is empowered to "determine the rights of the parties in an action." Thus, the court
could allow the default against the driver alone, and disallow any
action on this judgment against the appearing insurer until it has
had a chance to defend on the merits.

See Pigott v. Field, 10 App. Div. 2d 99, 101, 197 N.Y.S2d 648, 651
(1st Dep't 1960); Vidal v. Sheffield Farms Co., 208 Misc. 438, 141
N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955).
69 See" CPLR 603; 2 WEInSTEIN, Koax & Miu.aE, Nzw Yo K C1vr.

PRA~ccz 602.17 (1965).
70 C.W. Lauman & Co. v. State, 2 Misc. 2d 693, 153 N.Y.S2d 813 (Ct.
Cl. 1956).
7147 Misc. 2d 698, 263 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. Seneca County 1965).
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Frenkel v. Kress Taxi, Inc., 208 Misc. 374, 144 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Sup. Ct
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